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Introduction: Previous studies have shown that Swiss health-care financing is particularly regressive. However, as it
has been emphasized in the 2011 OECD Review of the Swiss Health System, the inter cantonal variations of
income-related inequities are still broadly unexplored. The present paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing the
differences in the level of equity of health-care system financing across cantons and its evolution over time using
household data.
Methods: Following the methodology proposed by Wagstaff et al. (JHE 11:361–387, 1992) we use the Kakwani
index as a summary measure of regressivity and we compute it for each canton and for each of the sources that
have a role in financing the health care system. We graphed concentration curves and performed relative
dominance tests, which utilize the full distribution of expenditures.
The microdata come from the Swiss Household Income and Expenditure Survey (SHIES) based on a sample of the
Swiss population (about 3500 households per year), for the years 1998 - 2005.
Results: The empirical evidence confirms that the health-care financing in Switzerland has remained regressive
since the major reform of 1996 and shows that the variations in equity across cantons are quite significant: the
difference between the most and the least regressive canton is about the same as between two extremely different
financing systems like the US and Sweden. There is no evidence, instead, of a clear evolution over time of regressivity.
Conclusions: The significant variation in equity across cantons can be explained by fiscal federalism and the related
autonomy in the design of tax and social policies. In particular, the results highlight that earmarked subsidies, the
policy adopted to smooth the regressivity of the premiums, appear to be not enough; in the practice of federal states
the combination of allowances with mandatory community-rated health insurance premiums might lead to a modest
outcome in terms of equity.
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The idea that health-care services should be paid for ac-
cording to the ability to pay rather than according to the
actual use of the health-care system finds its roots in the
egalitarian concept of social justice and is generally
adopted in Switzerland, as it is in most of the OECD
countries. It is common in the economic literature to in-
dicate this idea using the concept of equity in financing
[1]. This principle implies not only a form of solidarity
between the sick and the healthy, which is implicit in
any health insurance system, but also solidarity between* Correspondence: paola.salari@usi.ch
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumrich and poor. In this context, two measures of equity
exist. The first is “horizontal equity”, which claims equal
treatments for equals; i.e., that people with the same income
have to contribute the same amount of money to the total
expenditures. The second measure is “vertical equity”,
which states that people with different income must
contribute appropriate amounts to the total expenditure.
All of the empirical studies on this topic measure
the equity of a financing source in terms of progressivity;
i.e., the extent to which higher-income people pay more as
a proportion of their income than lower- income people.
When the new Health Insurance Act (HIA) came into
force in 1996, many things changed in the Swiss health-care
system. The main objectives of the act were to guaranteentral Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
Table 1 Main papers about equity in the health-care
financing system
Country Author(s) and year
Italy Paci and Wagstaff (1993) [7]
Australia Lairson et al. (1995) [8]
The Netherlands Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (1997) [9]
Finland Klavus (1998 and 2001) [10,11]
Sweden Gerdtham and Sundberg (1998) [12]
Malaysia Yu et al. (2008) [13]
Switzerland Bilger (2008) [3]
Palestine Abu-Zaineh et al. (2008) [14]
Ireland Smith (2010) [15]
Tanzania Mtei et al. (2012) [16]
Iran Alireza (2011) [17]
Ghana Akazili et al. (2011) [18]
13 OECD countries Wagstaff et al. (1999) [2]
10 OECD countries Wagstaff et al. (1992) [5]
13 Asian countries O’Donnell et al. (2008) [19]
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health insurers and to equip the political system with better
cost containment tools. Moreover, it also increased the
importance of the financing equity aim: one of the objec-
tives of the reform was to provide monetary assistance to
low-income households in order to increase equity of
financing. In the federal draft bill issued in the year 1991
(and approved some years later after many amendments
as HIA) we can read that: The main priority of the pro-
ject is undoubtedly the strengthening of solidarity. The
current law provides for individual premiums to be
paid without taking into account the economic situation
of the people insured (p.67). In order to make this pay-
ment affordable for all citizens, the new law replaced
the historically grown system of general state transfers
to health insurance with a better endowed and more
equitable system of allowances targeted to low-income
households.
At present the health insurance in Switzerland is
mandatory for every citizen, and it is based on community-
rated premiums. The confederation jointly with cantons
assigns a budget cap for earmarked subsidies targeting
low-income households. Cantons have a great autonomy
in deciding the distribution of subsidies; despite their role
of mitigating vertical inequity, the heterogeneity of cantonal
subsidy policies leads to a different treatment of similar
households across cantons (horizontal inequity). As subsid-
ies vary with cantons, people with the same income living
in different cantons may pay a different amount of money
for health care.
Some studies have demonstrated that the general level
of health system financing is regressive in Switzerland,
both before and after the reform [2,3]. This means that
lower-income people pay more as a proportion of their
income than higher-income people.
Nevertheless, these studies consider only the whole of
Switzerland and no research has monitored the situation
at the cantonal level. Due to the Swiss federal setting,
each canton differs in the economic strategy it has
adopted to finance the health care system; this leads to
different levels of equity among them. The OECD
Review of the Swiss Health System [4] considers the
development of an information system able to monitor
this inter-cantonal variation as one of the Swiss policy
challenges for the future.
This paper aims to fill this information gap by analyzing
the level of equity in the financing of the health-care
system in the Swiss cantons. In this study we have used
the methodology suggested by Wagstaff et al. [5] to
compute the regressivity level of each canton through
the Kakwani index [6].
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a review of the most relevant literature in this
field. We have collected and summarized similar studiesconducted for other countries, as well as for all of
Switzerland. The subsequent sections include: a brief
explanation of Swiss health system financing; the de-
scription of the dataset and the methodology used;
the discussion of the results obtained, some lessons
for a federal state, and the limitations of the study.
Finally, the last section offers some conclusions.Literature review
This work finds its place among the studies about the
equity of health-care system financing.
Table 1 includes the main papers that have been pub-
lished on this topic. Some of them have focused on a
single country – namely Australia, Iran, Finland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Malaysia, Palestine, Ireland, Tanzania,
Ghana, Sweden, and Switzerland. Two papers present
an international comparison, based on 13 Asian countries
and 13 OECD countries, respectively.
Smith [15], Klavus [10], Akazili et al. [18], and Abu-
Zaineh et al. [14] analyzed the inequity in financing
through the Kakwani index as well as through a “dis-
aggregated approach”; the latter provides summary
measures over specific income groups, by using the
dominance test to assess the level of progressivity for
different deciles of income distribution.
Another different method consists of separating the
redistributive effect into three parts: vertical, horizontal,
and reranking effect. The works by Lairson et al. [8] for
Australia and Gerdtham and Sundberg [12] for Sweden
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methodology in the case of Switzerland.
Many studies have analyzed the equity of health system
financing at the national level, while very few studies have
explored this issue at the subnational level. Abu-Zaineh
et al. [14] and Alireza [17] extended the analysis by
computing the Kakwani index for two different regions
of a given country: the former included in the study
the two regions of the Occupied Palestinian territory
(i.e. the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and the latter
applied the Kakwani index to urban and rural areas of Iran.
As far as Switzerland is concerned, the issue of the
health-care system financing has been explored by Wagstaff
et al. [2,5] and Bilger [3]. All three papers provide evidence
in favor of highly regressive financing.
Wagstaff et al. [5] presented an international comparison
of health-care financing across 10 countries. The score of
the Kakwani index for Switzerland was based on 1982 data
and was significantly negative (-0.117). Moreover, the Swiss
healthcare financing was the second most regressive, after
the U.S. (Kakwani index of -0.145).
In 1999, the same authors, along with some others,
updated their previous paper with more recent data.
In line with their previous work, the analysis for
Switzerland shows that the new Kakwani index, based
on the data of 1992, is -0.1402. In ten years the inequity
level of financing grew even worse.
Bilger [3] provided another important contribution to
the analysis of financing equity in Switzerland. For his ana-
lysis, he used the Swiss Household Income and Expenditure
Survey (SHIES) of 1998, which contains data from 9295
Swiss households. He found evidence that health system
financing in post-reform Switzerland remains very regres-
sive. In particular, the paper concludes that the reform
failed to reduce vertical inequity.
Starting from this strand of literature, the current paper
aims to go a step further. The goal is to analyze the differ-
ences in the regressivity of the financing system at a
sub-national level. Apart from the two previously noted
exceptions (focusing on two regions of the same country),
this is the first attempt to provide a systematic analysis of
financing equity at the level of the single entities of a fed-
eral state (in this case, Switzerland at the cantonal level).
Switzerland is an ideal country in which to add this new
piece of evidence, as it can be set in a context of fiscal fed-
eralism, where the cantons have large freedom to decide
on the financing sources for health care and in the design
of the tax system [20].
Swiss health system financing
General framework
The Swiss health care system is based on a mixed private-
social health insurance, and it is financed through several
sources (in brackets the 2009 shares on the total health carecosts): public expenditure (28%), mandatory health insurance
(29%), general social insurances (6%), complementary health
insurance (9%), co-payments and out-of-pocket (27%), other
private (1%) expenses.
Public expenditure
Federal, cantonal and local authorities contribute to the
health care system mainly in two forms:
 Direct subsidy of specific services (inpatient hospital
care, nursing homes, home care), mostly paid by
cantons, and payment of public health interventions
(like prevention and health promotion).
 Indirect financing through earmarked subsidies for
lower-income people who cannot afford mandatory
health insurance, funded jointly by the Confederation
and the cantons, and other means-tested allowances
for specific target groups.
All these activities are financed through tax revenues:
they include both direct and indirect taxes for the
Confederation, mostly direct taxes for cantons and
municipalities. In particular direct taxes consist of income
taxes for the Confederation and both income and property
taxes for cantons and municipalities.
Mandatory health insurance (MHI)
The health insurance in Switzerland, mandatory since
the reform of 1996, consists of a monthly community
rated premium that does not depend on the level of
income. However, different premiums are set for two age-
classes: lower premiums for children (age <19) and higher
for adults. Moreover, insurers are free to grant a discount
for students between 19 and 25. Health insurance is offered
through a variable number of private nonprofit sickness
funds (ranging from 118 in 1998, to 85 in 2005 and to the
current number of 66 in 2012). It covers a comprehensive
benefit basket fixed at the federal level. Coverage starts
once the yearly deductible (minimum of 300 CHF, about
330 US$, in the standard contract) has been reached
and includes a 10 percent copayment (up to a maximum
amount of 700 CHF per year). People can opt for higher
deductibles (up to 2500 CHF) and get in exchange a
premium discount. Premiums are set at the regional
level by each health insurer. Some cantons are consid-
ered as a single premium community, whereas others
(including urban and rural areas) are divided in two or
three regions (the total number of premium communities
declined between 1998 and 2005 from 78 to 43). As a
consequence, premiums significantly differ across regions
and cantons, reflecting the huge differences in health care
expenditures. Significant variation exists also across health
insurers [21], due in particular to a still ineffective risk
adjustment mechanism [22]. Horizontal equity across
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individuals with the same income pay significantly more
or less depending on what premium region they are
resident in. Moreover, not even horizontal equity within
the same premium region can be completely achieved,
due to competition in insurance market, switching decisions
by consumers, different deductibles and the option to sign
managed care contracts.
As mentioned before, for people earning an income
under a certain threshold, the Confederation and the
cantons jointly fund earmarked subsidies that cover
part or the total of the monthly premium (full coverage
concerns in particular retired and disabled people receiving
means-tested benefits).
General social insurances
This is Bismarckian insurance system designed to cover
through in cash benefits other (non-health) risks like
longevity, disability and accident. In some circumstances
it provides also benefits through in kind health care services.
It covers, in particular, spending for rehabilitation in case of
disability and the health care costs in case of professional
and non-professional accidents of employed persons.
Complementary health insurance
People can choose to pay a risk-rated premium (for individ-
ual contracts) or a community-rated premium (for collective
contracts) to have a voluntary supplementary private health
insurance. It covers some health-care services or inpatient
hospital amenities that are not included in the compulsory
benefit basket.
Out-of-pocket
The out-of-pocket expenses include the co-participation
to costs (namely the deductible and the 10% co-payment)
as well as all other health care expenses not covered in
the general contract (e.g. nursing homes fees, dental
care, OTC drugs, etc.).
Some of the financing strategy rules are decided at the
federal level. However, Swiss federalism allows cantons
to make their own decision regarding the exact design of
the financing policy they want to adopt.
The cantonal scope of action can take several forms.
Firstly, a different mixture of the financing sources
chosen by each cantona determines a different level of
regressivity: cantons that rely more on the MHI than on
public expenditure are more likely to be regressive than
those that choose to finance the system more through
general taxation. Secondly, cantonal autonomy due to
fiscal federalism allows significant leeway in deciding the
subsidies policy for the worse-off [23-25]. Cantons are
allowed to make their own decisions regarding the eligibil-
ity criteria for receiving benefits, which creates heterogen-
eity in their distribution and which leads to differences inthe level of regressivity among cantons. Thirdly, each can-
ton has significant leeway in the definition of the tax rates
for income and property taxes, whereas each municipality
decides every year the percentage of the cantonal tax
liability to be paid as local taxes.
According to cantons’ choices, different equity (or inequity)
levels are thus determined.
Evidence of heterogeneity at the cantonal level
Due to data availability problem, in the analysis that follows
we are forced to rely only on the first three funding sources
in the list, i.e. public financing, MHI and general social
insurances. The part of financing that we are considering is
called socialized health expenditure (SHE), since it reflects
collective spending for the universally accessible basket of
health care benefits. It accounts for approximately 60 - 65%
of the total financing in Switzerland.
Hence, in our analysis, we will decompose SHE in four
sources: federal taxes (including direct tax and VAT),
cantonal and municipal taxes (henceforth we will refer to
this second group of tax simply as cantonal tax), mandatory
health insurance (computed as net premium, i.e. the dif-
ference between the privately paid premium and the
earmarked subsidies), and general social insurancesb.
The first column in Table 2 considers the amount of
the SHE for each canton and for Switzerland as a whole
in absolute per capita values for 2005. The second col-
umn shows the incidence of SHE on average disposable
income.
The last four columns of Table 2 represent the pro-
portion of the expenditure financed by each source.
We computed these weights as an average for the con-
sidered period (1998 - 2005).
The first evidence from the table relates to the absolute
level of expenditure which differs greatly across cantons.
With respect to the Swiss average of 4243 CHF (registered
in 2005, the latest year considered in the empirical analysis),
canton Geneva and Basel City present the highest value
of expenditures, with 6578 and 5854 CHF, respectively.
Cantons Appenzell Inner Rhodes and Obwald register the
smallest expenditure values (with 2988 CHF and 3155
CHF, respectively). As far as the incidence is concerned, it
ranges from 5.15% of disposable income in the rich and
low SHE canton of Zug to almost the double in Geneva,
Jura and Neuchâtel. Whereas in Geneva it is the high level
of SHE that determines the heavy burden for households,
in Jura (where SHE is aligned with Swiss average) the high
incidence is rather driven by a low average income.
However, the differences do not only concern the
total amount of expenditure: another evident differ-
ence between cantons is the proportion of each of the
single financing sources.
The table also shows that, in cantons where the total
expenditure is higher, the share of the cantonal part tends
Table 2 Socialized health expenditure – absolute value (2005) and share of each financing source (average 1998–2005)
SHE per
capita (CHF)











Zurich (ZH) 4198 6.66% 10% 29% 13% 48%
Bern (BE) 4297 8.52% 11% 30% 13% 46%
Lucerne (LU) 3461 7.19% 13% 25% 16% 46%
Uri (UR) 3379 6.85% 13% 26% 16% 45%
Schwyz (SZ) 3581 6.14% 13% 25% 15% 47%
Obwald (OW) 3155 7.40% 14% 27% 16% 43%
Nidwald (NW) 3385 6.21% 13% 27% 16% 44%
Glarus (GL) 3541 8.01% 12% 30% 14% 44%
Zug (ZG) 3885 5.15% 12% 30% 14% 44%
Fribourg (FR) 3876 8.42% 12% 28% 14% 46%
Solothurn (SO) 4002 7.78% 11% 26% 14% 49%
Basel City (BS) 5854 9.31% 8% 39% 9% 44%
Basel Land (BL) 4197 7.60% 11% 27% 13% 49%
Schaffausen (SH) 4070 9.06% 11% 31% 13% 45%
Appenzell O. Rhodes (AR) 3505 6.33% 13% 27% 16% 44%
Appenzell I. Rhodes (AI) 2988 6.81% 16% 20% 19% 45%
St. Gall (SG) 3465 6.76% 13% 24% 15% 48%
Grisons (GR) 3837 7.18% 12% 29% 14% 45%
Argovia (AG) 3575 6.60% 13% 20% 15% 52%
Thurgovia (TG) 3204 7.10% 14% 19% 16% 51%
Ticino (TI) 4852 9.66% 10% 29% 12% 49%
Vaud (VD) 4858 9.01% 9% 30% 11% 50%
Valais (VS) 3732 8.32% 12% 30% 14% 44%
Neuchâtel (NE) 5017 10.44% 9% 33% 11% 47%
Geneva (GE) 6578 10.10% 7% 43% 8% 42%
Jura (JU) 4381 10.43% 10% 30% 12% 48%
Switzerland (CH) 4243 7.85% 11% 29% 13% 47%
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(and consequently premiums) are higher, many households
cannot afford anymore the cost of mandatory health insur-
ance, which means that cantons are forced to spend more
in terms of subsidies for the worse-off.
The values in the table show that the most important
part is financed by health insurers. This accounts, on
average, for 47 percent of the SHE. The second source
derives from the cantonal taxes that cover 29 percent of the
SHE, followed by the social insurances and federal taxes
that account for 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
Finally, it is worth noting the magnitude of the differ-
ences among cantons. There are two cantons for which
the part financed by cantonal taxes is considerably larger
(Geneva - 43 percent; Basel City - 39 percent), whereas
in Appenzell Inner Rhodes the share financed by cantonal
taxes corresponds to only 20 percent.Dataset
The micro dataset is the Swiss Household Income and
Expenditure Survey (SHIES), which allows computation of
household income at a very detailed level, including all the
taxes and social contributions paid, as well as the health
expenditures (premiums and, only to some extent, out-of-
pocket expenditures) and indemnities related to health
(subsidies from the state and reimbursements from the in-
surance companies).
This survey is available from 1998 to 2005 (excluding
1999) and is based on a sample of the Swiss population (ap-
proximately 3500 households observed for each of the years
between 2000 and 2005, and 9295 observations for 1998).
The SHIES does not guarantee that the households
sample is representative at the level of all cantons for each
year, but only at the level of seven macro-regions, each
of which groups cantons together according to their
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control for the differences due to the federal setting, we
were interested in maintaining the cantonal dimension.
For this reason, we decided to merge the dataset of each
year to obtain a representative sample at the cantonal level.
This has been possible because different people were inter-
viewed each year for each canton. In this way we were able
to control for the cantonal differences, but we lost the in-
formation about the variation over time for each canton.
Ultimately, this study concentrates on the between-
variation for each canton and on the within-variation only
for the whole Switzerland and the seven macro-regions.
There are some differences in the questionnaires, especially
for the year 1998 with respect to the other years. Only in
the wave of interviews taken in 1998, were people asked to
report all the medical expenses (greater than 150 CHF) they
had during the whole year preceding the month of the sur-
vey and not only all the medical expenses they had during
the month of the interview (as it is in the other waves of
the survey). Moreover, only for the year 1998 responders
had to register the reimbursements received by the insur-
ance companies during the whole year; hence there was a
correspondence between the expenditures and their reim-
bursements. The collection of this data makes it possible to
compute the out-of-pocket expenditures for each house-
holds and, consequently, to have a robust proxy for the
yearly out-of-pocket financing at least for the year 1998.
Methods: Kakwani index, concentration curves
and dominance test
In order to measure the regressivity of each financing
source, we used the procedure proposed by Wagstaff
et al. [2], (see also [26] for the empirical implementa-
tion). We started by computing the Kakwani index for
each financing source and then we computed a total
Kakwani index aggregating these results with a weighted
average, using as weights the proportion of each finan-
cing source with respect to the total financing. This pro-
cedure has been applied to 23 cantonsd, to the seven
macro-regions, and to Switzerland as a whole.
This index is computed as the difference between the
concentration index of each financing source and the
Gini index calculated on the (equivalent disposable)
household income before considering any health-related
expenditures (we refer to this as pre-health income). If
the two curves coincide, the difference between the CI
and the Gini index is zero and the financing source can
be considered as proportional to income.
The formula is as follows:
Kip ¼ CIip–Gini prei Range: −2:þ 1½ 
where i indicates the geographical unit of analysis and p the
different financing sources available in the dataset.CIip is the concentration index of each financing source
p. CI is twice the area between the concentration curve of
the source p and the 45-degree line. It indicates whether
the variable of interest is more concentrated among
the poor (the concentration curve lies above the equal-
ity line and the index has a negative value) or among
the rich (the curve lies below the equality line and the
index has a positive value).
Gini_prei is the Gini index for the pre-health income.
Since the Swiss fiscal system does not rely on earmarked
taxes for health care, we simply imputed to the amount of
taxes paid by each household the share of total health ex-
penditure financed by that tax. We did this for federal tax,
cantonal tax, and also for general social insurances.














k¼1yhk is the gross income for the household h,
which, according to the definition given in [3],
consists of the sum of all income earned from work
and self-employment, interest, house rental, social





   schs is the part of the general social
insurance paid by the household h and not directed
towards financing health care. In particular, μs is the
share of health care services funded out of the
budget of the social insurances. In 2005, μs was 3.3
percent for the pension and the disability insurance,
and 24.5 percent for the accident insurance.

Xp
v¼1 1−τvð Þ  thv are the taxes (federal, cantonal and
municipal) paid by the household h and not directed
towards financing the healthcare system. As in [3],
federal indirect taxes were proxied with VAT, which
accounts for two-thirds of total indirect taxes. VAT
has been computed from the data on consumptions
that household declared in the survey.
As in the case of social contribution, τv is the part
used to finance the health care system for each type
of tax (v), so 1-τv is the residual part that is not used
within the health sector.
To give an idea of the dimension of these
coefficients, in 2005 τv was 5.4 percent for federal
tax, 28.5 percent (on average) for cantonal tax and
4.3 percent (on average) for communal tax.Disposable income before health-care financing has been
corrected using an equivalence scale in order to make house-
holds with a different number of members comparablee.
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values have been deflated through the consumer price
index (CPI) for Switzerland.
Kakwani is a useful index for providing information
about the shift from proportionality. However, it is an
extremely summary measure, and its information can be
sometimes misleading if the distributions underlying the
Kakwani index are not considered alike. When curves
cross, a value of Kakwani equal to zero could be the re-
sult of a concentration curve that is progressive for half
of the population and regressive for the other half. To
control for this, we look also at the concentration curves
and the relative dominance test, that aims to define sta-
tistically whether one curve dominates another. The null
hypothesis indicates that there is no significant differ-
ence between the two concentration curves considered.
The choice criterion used here is the multiple compari-
son approach. In the comparison between the two
curves, the null is rejected if there is at least one signifi-
cant difference between them in one direction and no
significant difference in the other direction. The ordi-
nates are compared in 19 different quintiles, as sug-
gested by O’Donnell et al. [26].
Results
Table 3 presents the results of the Kakwani index over time
for the whole Switzerland and for the seven macro-regions.
The most notable result is that the total value of the
Kakwani index is always negative, which means that the
Swiss health-care system financing remains regressive,
even after the major reform of 1996; this result is in line
with the previous literature. The other notable point is
that the results do not seem to vary widely in the years
considered, neither for all of Switzerland nor for any of
the macro-regions. The most regressive year appears to
be 1998, although the data provides no evidence of any
clear temporal trend.
Macro-region 7 (Ticino) seems to reach the best value
in terms of equity, for all the years considered, since the
Kakwani is not statistically different from zero in 2002,Table 3 Kakwani index over time
1998 2000 2001
Macro-region 1 -0.136** [1495] -0.091** [590] -0.069** [586]
Macro-region 2 -0.106** [2173] -0.081** [925] -0.081** [907]
Macro-region 3 -0.103** [1287] -0.099** [504] -0.044* [516]
Macro-region 4 -0.130** [1659] -0.138** [638] -0.092** [612]
Macro-region 5 -0.130** [1183] -0.116** [433] -0.125** [478]
Macro-region 6 -0.136** [806] -0.135** [329] -0.080* [300]
Macro-region 7 -0.087** [692] -0.074** [223] -0.078** [341]
CH -0.130** [9295] -0.110** [3642] -0.084** [3740]
Significance level: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
The values in brackets show the sample size.2003 and 2005. Macro-region 4 (Zurich) is in line with
the Swiss average, and macro-region 3 (Basel City, Basel
Land, and Argovia) is, after Ticino, the least regressive
group of cantons.
The weighted Kakwani index for the SHE in Switzerland
ranged from -0.084, reached in 2001, and -0.13 in 1998f.
Table 4 presents the Kakwani indexes for the Swiss
cantons and helps shed light on how fiscal federalism
allows cantons to choose their preferred financing policy.
It is evident from the table that there are important
differences in the regressivity of the financing system
among cantons.
The Kakwani index for federal taxes is not statistically
different from zero for all the cantons apart from canton
Basel Land (BL), which has a slightly progressive value.
This means that federal taxes are concentrated quite
proportionally among the population. This result could be
easily explained if we think that the tax amount considered
here is the sum of a progressive federal direct tax (based on
income) and an indirect tax (VAT) based on consumption
that is normally regressive. Canton Basel Land is the only
one in which the effect of the progressive direct tax more
than offsets the effect of the regressive VAT.
The Kakwani indexes for the cantonal and municipal
taxes are more difficult to explain. While we would expect
a highly progressive value, most of them are not statistically
different from zero. Only Solothurn (SO), Ticino (TI),
and Basel Land (BL) present a slightly positive value of the
Kakwani index, which means a slightly progressive tax.
These values are smaller than the results expected, but
there are at least two reasons that could explain them.
First of all, this financing source includes both can-
tonal and municipal tax. Very rich households may
choose to live in jurisdictions that have a lower local
(municipal) taxation. Therefore, a richer household may
have to pay the same cantonal tax, but a different
(lower) municipal tax than a poorer household that lives
in a municipality with higher taxation. This could bias
the progressivity results in favor of a score that cannot
reject the hypothesis of proportionality.2002 2003 2004 2005
-0.065** [603] -0.099** [528] -0.090** [505] -0.074** [502]
-0.109** [840] -0.105** [788] -0.085** [780] -0.109** [751]
-0.062** [529] -0.065** [482] -0.076** [441] -0.084** [400]
-0.094** [640] -0.104** [622] -0.111** [562] -0.112** [531]
-0.119** [469] -0.084** [438] -0.137** [420] -0.147** [417]
-0.089** [313] -0.108** [289] -0.125** [287] -0.075** [245]
-0.034 [332] -0.027** [328] -0.083** [275] -0.016** [241]
-0.094** [3726] -0.098** [3475] -0.104** [3270] -0.101* [3087]













ZH 5264 0.0088 0.0389 0.0074 -0.2548** -0.1085**
BE 4191 -0.0052 -0.0121 0.0330** -0.20806** -0.0947**
LU 1353 -0.0069 0.0181 0.0560** -0.2298** -0.0936**
SZ 450 -0.0578 -0.0417 0.0025 -0.2508** -0.1344**
OW 129 0.0387 0.0744 0.0999** -0.2323** -0.0567**
NW 158 0.0236 0.1256 0.0594 -0.2738** -0.0729**
GL 138 0.0063 0.0135 0.0366 -0.2304** -0.0913**
ZG 375 0.1093 0.0540 -0.0230 -0.2603** -0.0871**
FR 916 -0.0159 -0.0121 0.0246 -0.1863** -0.0874**
SO 1013 -0.0311 0.0473** 0.0536** -0.2109** -0.0868**
BS 782 0.0485 0.0835 -0.0001 -0.2149** -0.0582**
BL 1066 0.0557* 0.0933** -0.0042 -0.2191** -0.0774**
SH 295 -0.0963 -0.1310 -0.0059 -0.2239** -0.1535**
SG 1648 0.0011 0.0407 0.0369* -0.2571** -0.1066**
GR 723 -0.0481 -0.0327 0.0231 -0.2605** -0.1285**
AG 2311 0.0200 0.0308 0.0147 -0.2250** -0.1065**
TG 806 0.0251 -0.0372 0.0406* -0.2281** -0.1131**
TI 2432 0.0122 0.0850** 0.0310* -0.1800** -0.0592**
VD 2531 -0.0148 0.0131 -0.0099 -0.2050** -0.1004**
VS 1083 -0.0464 -0.0435 -0.0006 -0.2123** -0.1114**
NE 776 -0.0526 0.0306 -0.0035 -0.2009** -0.0904**
GE 1195 0.0277 0.0976 -0.0673** -0.2482** -0.0643*
JU 268 -0.0076 0.0799 0.0549 -0.1809** -0.0566**
CH 30232 0.0074 0.0153 0.0090* -0.2271** -0.0999**
Significance level: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/13/1/17A second reason could be the fact that there is a mis-
matching between household income that refers to the
year of the interview and household taxes that are paid
on income earned the year prior to the interview. There
could be situations in which a person has reduced his or
her revenues (perhaps because they have temporarily lost
their job or have retired), but reports to pay high taxes
because she/he earned a “regular” income in the previous
year. This could worsen the situation of regressivity because
the Kakwani index is computed as if tax paid and income
earned referred always to the same yearg.
As expected, the Kakwani indexes for the general social
insurance are not statistically different from zero. Since
the tax rate is the same for every wage earned, regardless
of its level, we expected a Kakwani value near to zero.
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Four cantons
(Bern, Lucerne, Obwald, and Solothurn) present a pro-
gressive value, while canton Geneva is the only one
that has a regressive index for this financing source.
This could be because the share of capital income over thetotal income in Geneva is higher than in the other cantons
(and, consequently the wage income share is lower):
the fact that the payment for the social insurance is
only based on wage income could induce a regressive
effect in the results.
The most interesting results are those for the mandatory
health insurance. They are all significant for each canton
and range from a value of -0.18 for canton Ticino to -0.27
for canton Nidwald.
It is quite notable that the values can be so different,
even in neighboring cantons: the value of the index in
canton Grisons (-0.26) is 0.08 less than that of its neighbor,
Ticino (-0.18). Based on the Welch’s t-test, we can show
that this difference is statistically significant at the 95% level.
This outcome probably hides a different choice in the
subsidy policy that cantonal authorities are free to set-
up. Previous studies (see [21,23]) have shown that on
average the same family (e.g. parents with two children
and a revenue of 70’000 CHF) has to devote 4.4% of
disposable income if it lives in Obwald, but up to 16.4% if
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reflects the premium level and the generosity of the sub-
sidy policy. In general cantons with a very high level of
premiums prefer to distribute generous subsidies to a lim-
ited group of citizens, whereas those with lower premiums
levels choose to reach more people by distributing lower
subsidy amounts [4]. There is one clear outlier-canton
which distributes higher subsidies than the average to an
above-average share of the population, namely Ticino
(Crivelli et al. [27] show that the subsidy policy in Ticino
is 34.5 percent more generous in terms of CHF spent per
capita than the Swiss average). This might explain why
in Ticino the net premiums are less regressive than
elsewhere. On the other hand Grisons distributes subsidies
that are below the Swiss average and support only a limited
number of people. This strategy seems to be in line with
the computed Kakwani for MHI, which is in the case of
Grisons the most regressive one.
Finally, the results on the total Kakwani indices are all
statistically significanth and all negative.
The cantons that appear to be the most regressive ones
are canton Schaffhausen and Schwyz, with a Kakwani equal
to -0.15 and -0.13, respectively. The cantons that reach the
best results in terms of equity are Jura, Obwald and Ticino,
all of which have a Kakwani value of around -0.05.
It is worth noting that the difference between the least
(Jura) and the most regressive canton (Schaffhausen) is
considerable (approximately 0.10) and significant at 99%
level (according to the Welch’s t-test); it is the same as the
difference between the US (-0.13) and Sweden (-0.015)
from the Wagstaff et al.’s (1999) study, countries that have
two completely different health-care financing systems.
Although Shaffausen and the Jura have greater absolute
levels of regressivity than the US and Sweden respectively.
We now report the concentration curves and the
dominance tests results.
A general summary comment, based only on the visual
inspection of the concentration curves, would suggest
that their order follows a similar pattern for all the can-
tons. Firstly, starting from the 45-degree line and going
down, the net premium curve is always the first one,
very close to the 45-degree line and not crossing with the
others. Secondly, the social contribution curve is generally
the next one, always very near to the Lorenz curve, which
indicates proportionality. Thirdly, the federal tax line is also
quite near to the Lorenz curve and, finally, the cantonal tax
curve is always the most distant and lies under the Lorenz,
indicating progressivity. Nevertheless, the two curves
for taxes and the one relative to the social insurance
often cross among them and with the Lorenz, which
indicates an alternation between regressivity among
the poorer and progressivity among the richer.
We have chosen to show the results only for canton
Geneva, which is among the least regressive.Figure 1 represents the concentration curves of each
financing source. The concentration curve for the net
premium is very close to the 45-degree line, indicating
quite strong regressivity, and it dominates the Lorenz
curve. In Table 5 we read that the poorest 30 percent of
the population receives about the 15 percent of the total
income and pays 26 percent of the net premium.
The tests of dominance (not shown in the table) find
evidence of dominance of the social contributions curve
on the Lorenz curve and dominance of the Lorenz curve
on the cantonal tax curve. These two last results tell us
two important things. Firstly, the dominance for the social
contribution curve confirms the result of the Kakwani
index: the social contributions are regressive in Geneva,
while the situation is different for the cantonal tax.
This financing source seems to be progressive, but only
starting from the second decile of the ranked population
(i.e., for the richest 80 percent). For the poorest 20 percent
of the ranked population, we cannot reject the hypothesis
of proportionality (as the difference between the two curves
is not statistically significant).
Discussion: lessons for a federal state
The most relevant evidence is that the regressivity of the
MHI implies that the subsidy policy adopted by the state
does not succeed in making the financing of this source
progressive or, at least, proportional. Considering that
the subsidy is the most important tool that cantons have
to mitigate the regressive nature of the community-rated
premiums, this is a very strong result for policy makers.
However, the value of Kakwani here includes something
more than the effects of the earmarked subsidies chosen
by the cantons. Also, the individual choices (premium and
deductible) allowed by the competitive setting of the Swiss
health insurance have a significant impact on equity. The
Swiss system encourages competition between insurance
companies, which plays out in the level of the premium
and in the quality of service; twice per year, people have
the option to switch to another insurance company
(with lower premiums, e.g.). Moreover, citizens are allowed
to obtain a discount on the monthly premiums by choosing
a higher deductible; by assuming some of the financial
consequences of getting sick themselves, they can pay
a smaller monthly premiumi. Finally, people who choose
to be part of a managed care plan can also get a discount
on premiums. These choice options are not constrained
to a certain level of income, but there is evidence that not
all citizens can manage the available information to make
a rational choice in terms of switching [21] or of selecting
the appropriate type of contracts. Accordingly, we cannot
exclude the existence of a social gradient in the ability to
manage information. In this case, the burden of solidarity
with the sick implied by community rating may be par-
tially shifted back from the good risk to the bad risk as
Figure 1 Concentration curves for each financing source, canton Geneva.
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consequences on the equity level.
Similarly, the Kakwani index of taxation includes also
an indirect (or endogenous) effect due to individual
choices. For example, very rich people may decide to
live in a canton (or municipality) with a less progres-
sive taxation to pay less taxes and this may also have
an impact on the regressivity level of the canton. If this
effect increases or decreases the regressivity depends
on the distribution of income among the population.
Another consideration needs to be specified. The
Kakwani index considers only the relative financing
burden of households with respect to others, not the
absolute burden of the health financing. The poor in a
canton with a slightly regressive financing may have to pay
absolutely more for health care than people with the same





Cum. share of canton
and municipal taxes
Q10 2.78% 6.26%** 4.32%
Q20 8.24% 10.55%* 7.40%
Q30 14.75% 15.61% 11.21%*
Q40 22.35% 22.04% 16.60%**
Q50 30.82% 29.29% 23.69%**
Q60 40.31% 37.41% 32.80%**
Q70 50.92% 46.08%* 42.95%**
Q80 62.85% 57.53%* 53.94%**
Q90 76.98% 71.94% 69.61%*
Significance level: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. The significance level indicates whether the
source is significantly different from the income_pre.In other words, the Kakwani index is appropriate to
measure the level of vertical inequity, but it is not able
to capture the extent of horizontal inequity.
To have an idea of the dimension of horizontal inequity,
we computed the incidence of health expenditure on the
total income for different income classes. We found that
there is a similar general trend for all cantons; specifically,
the incidence for the lower-income classes is heavy and
decreases for the richer classes.
To exemplify this, the graphic representations for the
incidence of the financing burden for the cantons of Zug
and Geneva are reported below (Figure 2).
The red line represents the average incidence for each
of the income classes considered, while the blue-shadow
area indicates the confidence intervals. Interestingly, the
two red lines have a similar shape, although the line for
Geneva is shifted upwards with respect to the other.y income decile, canton Geneva
al Cum. share of general
social insurances











percentage share of financing.
Figure 2 Average incidence of the socialized health expenditure on income, Zug (left) and Geneva (right).
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of incidence is quite different: the share of income that
people in Geneva pay is almost double that of citizens
earning an equivalent income in Zug. This means that
people in Geneva (one of the least inequitable cantons)
pay more, not only in absolute value, but also as a per-
centage on their income than in Zug (one of the most
inequitable cantons in terms of the Kakwani analysis).
The reason for such a result can easily be found by
simply looking again at the absolute level of expenditure
(Table 2): Geneva registers one of the highest levels
(6578 CHF per capita), while Zug has one of the lowest
ones (3885 CHF per capita).
This example clearly shows that the burden of health-
care financing may be equally distributed, but may be
too heavy to be affordable for lower- and middle-income
people. To have a clear understanding of the equity issue,
the importance of the absolute expenditure levels cannot
be neglected.
The fact that people of the same income class show a
different incidence level across cantons suggests the
presence of horizontal inequity. We would like to highlight
a final remark upon this issue. The Swiss federalism allows
some form of autonomy to cantons, especially in deciding
the subsidy policy. Therefore, subsidies are an important
tool in reducing the vertical inequity within a canton, but,
on the other hand, being administered differently in each
canton, they may also lead to further horizontal inequity,
i.e. to more inequity across cantons.
Finally, we cannot disregard that one possible criticism
with respect to the equity issue is the potential trade-off
between equity and efficiency, according to what Okun
theorized in 1975 [28]. To check for this, we considered
the efficiency results found in a study by Widmer and
Zweifel [29] in which they performed a data envelop-
ment analysis for the Swiss cantons for six categories ofpublic goods, including health, using data relative to the
years 2000–2004. We ranked the cantons first according
to our equity results and then according to the efficiency
results found by the two authors. We compared the two
ranking lists through a Spearman test and a Kendall test
of rank correlation, but the results do not reject the null
hypothesis of independence. This leads to the conclusion
that there is no direct link between equity and efficiency
in this particular setting.
Conclusions
This study represents the first attempt to investigate the
impact of federalism on the financing of a universal health
insurance system in terms of equity.
We have analyzed the financing of the Swiss health-care
system from an equity point of view, with particular at-
tention to the differences across cantons. We used the
Kakwani index for each financing source to see how
each of them shifts from proportionality. The dominance
test for the concentration curves has also been performed
to exploit more the available information.
The general results suggest that Swiss health-care sys-
tem financing is regressive in all cantons, although there
are huge differences among them. The reason for this lies
in the federal setting, which allows cantons to have some
freedom in certain areas, such as how to design subsidy
policies for lower-income people, the choice of tax rates,
and the choice of how much of the total expenditure has
to be financed through taxation and how much through
mandatory health insurance. These factors, along with
the characteristics of the Swiss health-care system based
on competition among insurance companies and on the
supply of premium discounts for people opting for higher
deductibles and managed care contracts, bring different
levels of inequity. The results highlight the fact that
the level of regressivity of mandatory health insurance
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cantons, whereas for federal taxes and general social insur-
ance the hypothesis of proportionality cannot be rejected in
the majority of cantons. Finally, the cantonal tax is progres-
sive only in three cantons.
The main limitations of our paper are due to the dataset
on which we relied; we had to aggregate data of seven dif-
ferent years to get robust estimates at the cantonal level.
Moreover, we had to focus on SHE because the information
on out-of-pocket expenditure was not reliable for six out of
seven years. Since 2008, a new legislation has been enforced
in Switzerland that assigns to cantonal authorities even
more leeway regarding the subsidy policy (the matching
grants transfer has been replaced by a lump-sum payment).
It is therefore necessary to monitor the situation in more
recent years in order to figure out how inequity developed
in Swiss cantons after this reform.
The results contained in this work shed light on some
aspects that should be considered in other federal states
that are planning to use the regulation of private health
insurance and premium subsidies to ensure universal
coverage. Although the combination of community rating
and premium subsidies might be in theory the best solution
in terms of (vertical) equity [30], in the daily practice of
federal states the empirical evidence can point to a different
outcome. In fact, tax competition and a “race to the bot-
tom” in social policy (in order to avoid the outflow of good
taxpayers and the inflow of people looking for social aid)
may jointly lead to a lower level of vertical equity than a
sovereign state would choose if the design of social policy
would occur at the national levell.Endnotes
aE.g. until 2011 cantons had significant leeway in allo-
cating the public financing to private hospitals. This has
been changed by the new regulation of hospital financing
that started in 2012.
bThe available data does not provide any information
about the direct federal health expenditure given to each
canton or the amount of health expenditure from the
general social insurance spent in each canton. To compute
these two values, we took the total amount of expenditure
and simply imputed the same average spending for
each Swiss inhabitant, regardless of the canton in which
she/he lives. In the expenditure of the confederation
and the cantons, we also accounted for the amount of
the subsidies distributed.
cMacro-region 1 includes Vaud, Valais, and Geneva;
macro-region 2 includes Bern, Fribourg, Solothurn,
Neuchâtel, and Jura; macro-region 3 includes Basel City,
Basel Land, and Argovia; macro-region 4 includes Zurich;
macro-region 5 includes Glarus, Schaffhausen, Appenzell
O. Rh., Appenzell I.. Rh., St. Gall, Grisons, and Thurgovia;macro-region 6 includes Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Nidwald,
Obwald, and Zug; macro-region 7 includes Ticino.
dCanton Uri, canton Appenzell I. Rhodes, and canton
Appenzell O. Rhodes have not been considered because
the small number of observations in the dataset did not
allow for any robust computation.
eThe scale chosen is the OECD modified equivalence
scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the household head,
of 0.5 to each additional adult member and of 0.3 to
each child no older than 13.
fAs explained in section 4, data for 1998 was collected
in a different manner that makes it possible to compute the
Kakwani index for the total health expenditure, including
the out-of-pocket payment and the complementary insur-
ance. We computed this for all of Switzerland and found
that the equity results are even worse (Kakwani -0.14).
gThere is another factor to consider: the tax reform.
From 1990 until 2003 cantons, in turn, had to adapt their
system of taxation to a new one. This passage provoked
an asymmetry between the tax paid in one year and the
income earned in the same year that may have brought
some additional asymmetries also in our computations.
hThe standard error for the total Kakwani index
has been obtained summing the standard errors for
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iFinancially constrained households may ‘underinsure’
by choosing higher deductibles or switching to a more
restrictive insurance plan (managed care). Hence they
may incur higher out of pocket payments, which are not
measured in the study and which would underestimate
the inequity level.
lIn 1991, through the HIA draft bill, the Swiss federal
government suggested to fix the maximum incidence
level for health insurance premiums at 8% of the taxable
income. However, this ‘social target’ was not anchored in
the law and cantons were entrusted with large autonomy
in the design of their subsidy scheme. In actuality, in several
cantons a large part of the population pays for premiums a
share that significantly exceeds this threshold [21,23].Competing interests
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